





# Your Strategic Security Metrics Program

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# Strategic security approach

#### From subjective, qualitative to objective, quantitative







# Strategic security approach

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# • Why objective, quantitative information is better

 Clinical Versus Statistical Prediction: A Theoretical Analysis and Review of the Evidence (Meehl, 1954/1996)

"Empirical comparisons of the accuracy of the two methods (136 studies over a wide range of predictands) show that the mechanical method is almost invariably equal to or superior to the clinical method..."

• Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective on Risk Taking (Lovallo, Kahnemann, 1993)

"...decision makers are excessively prone to treat problems as unique, neglecting both the statistics of the past and the multiple opportunities of the future."







#### **Strategic security approach -** Just how human are we?

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**Decision Making and Behavioral Biases** Bandwagon effect Base rate fallacy Bias blind spot Choice-supportive bias Confirmation bias Contrast effect Endowment effect Extreme aversion Focusing effect Framing Hyperbolic discounting Illusion of control Impact bias Information bias Irrational escalation Loss aversion Mere exposure effect Moral credential effect Omission bias Outcome bias Planning fallacy Post-purchase rationalization Pseudocertainty effect Reactance Selective perception Status quo bias Unit bias Von Restorff effect Zero-risk bias

Biases in probability and belief Ambiguity effect Anchoring Attentional bias Availability heuristic Clustering illusion Capability bias Conjunction fallacy Gambler's fallacy Hawthorne effect Hindsight bias Illusory correlation Ludic fallacy Neglect of prior base rates effect Observer-expectancy effect Optimism bias Overconfidence effect Positive outcome bias Primacy effect Recency effect Regression toward the mean disregarded Reminiscence bump Rosy retrospection Selection bias Stereotyping Subadditivity effect Subjective validation Telescoping effect Texas sharpshooter fallacy

Social biases Actor-observer bias **Dunning-Kruger effect** Egocentric bias Forer effect (aka Barnum Effect) False consensus effect Fundamental attribution error Halo effect Herd instinct Illusion of asymmetric insight Illusion of transparency Ingroup bias Just-world phenomenon Lake Wobegon effect Notational bias Outgroup homogeneity bias Projection bias Self-serving bias Self-fulfilling prophecy System justification Trait ascription bias Memory errors Beneffectance Consistency bias Cryptomnesia Egocentric bias False memory Hindsight bias Suggestibility



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# Strategic security approach

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#### Bottom line

- Risk is impossible to eliminate
- Subjective approaches are full of bias and ambiguity
- Decisions are being made based on assumptions and guesses
- We must move toward objective approaches to be taken seriously
- In the end, we can demonstrate what a strong security program looks like





# A security metrics model

#### What does executive management want to know?

- What is our risk level?
- How strong is our security program?
- Are we maintaining appropriate cost control?

### What they don't want to know...

- How many security FTEs it takes to change a lightbulb?
- The risk difference between SSL VPNs and IPsec VPNs
- A smirky, self-righteous "nobody knows for sure"

### What we give them

- Red, Yellow, Green based on guesses
- Thumbs up, thumbs down







# A security metrics model How strategic is "strategic"?

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Moving "up the stack" without losing clarity is the challenge Corporate Reports: Money, ratios, index

Measures of broad matters as quality compare to that of competitors; time required to launch new products

Measures that help to establish departmental quality goals and to evaluate departmental performance against goals.

Technological units of measure for individual elements of product, process, service







# A security metrics model

• The lowest layer: the technology



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#### A security metrics model • Adding value and loss

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## A security metrics model

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#### • Estimating value and loss at an aggregate level

	Threshold	Loss Potential	
User Productivity	Unpaid overtime; alternative options	Hours x Rate x Downtime	
Revenue	Three-way- match; accounts receivable	Rev/Hr x Downtime; Shrinkage	
Liquid Assets	Manual reviews	Allowances	
Intellectual Property	Legal costs	Competitive revenue; market share	
IT Productivity	Direct costs	Hours x Rate x Work	
Legal/ Fines	Legal dept fees	Legal dept fees	
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#### A security metrics model • Adding value and loss

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# A security metrics modelControls and incidents

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#### A security metrics model • The complete model

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#### A security metrics model • High-level categories

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### • The Top Ten (1-5)

- Transaction Value (TV)
   (Total Value of IT and Information Assets \$ / Total Transactions)
- Transaction Cost (TC)

(Total Cost of IT and Information Assets \$ / Total Transactions)

- Controls per Transaction (CPT) (Total Number of Inline Control Events / Total Transactions)
- Cost per Control (CPC)

(Total Cost of Control \$ / Total Number of Inline Control Events)

Security to Value Ratio (STV)

(Total Security Costs \$ / Total Value of IT and Information Assets \$)



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#### • The Top Ten (6-10)

 Loss to Value Ratio (LTV) (Total Losses \$ / Total Value of IT and Information Assets \$)

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- Control Effectiveness Ratio (CE)
  - ((Good Allowed Control Events + Bad Denied Control Events) / Total Number of Inline Control Events)
- Incidents per Million (IPM); Incidents per Billion (IPB) ((Total Number of Incidents / Total Transactions) x One Million or Billion)
- Incident Prevention Rate (IPR)

(1 - (Total Incidents / (Good Denied + Total Incidents)))

Risk Aversion Ratio (RAR)

(Good Denied / Total Incidents)





#### **Top ten strategic metrics** • An example: Email

#### **Assumptions and Data**

#### **Calculated Metrics**

Value	\$ 1,000,000	Transaction Value (TV):	\$ 0.0025
Cost	\$ 250,000	Transaction Cost (TC):	\$ 0.000625
Security Cost	\$ 20,000		
Loss per Incident	\$ 300	Cost per Control (CPC):	\$ 0.000023529
Transactions	400,000,000		
		Controls per Transaction (CPT):	2.13
Validate IP	300,000,000		
Antispam	400,000,000	Security to Value Ratio (STV):	2%
Antivirus	150,000,000	Loss to Value Ratio (LTV):	15%
Good Allowed	80,000,000	Control Effectiveness (CE):	95%
Bad Denied	300,000,000	Incidents per Million (IPM):	1.25
Good Denied	200,000	Incident Prevention Rate (IPR):	99.9998%
Bad Allowed	500	Risk Aversion Ratio (RAR):	400





### **Top ten strategic metrics** • What will it look like?

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### Putting a plan into action

- Identify logical starting points
  - Where data is readily available
  - Closed or otherwise contained environments
  - Control-specific data
- Define the baseline
  - 3-6 months of data to evaluate variance
  - Average, weighted average, cycles, other trends
- Normalize the data
- Incorporate other data
  - From other controls, business units, geographic locations, etc.
- Compare to peers
  - Benchmark for same-size, same-industry peers







## Recommendations

#### Moving forward...

- Be consistent, but adapt
- Understand first, act second
- Think of data as inputs, not outputs
- Manage expectations
- Consider opportunities for benchmarking

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Get started

