



Case Studies: Mapping Products to Compliance

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Vik Phatak, CEO, NSS Labs

- Expert on vulnerability management and threat protection.
- Served as CTO for Trustwave (ATW), the world's largest PCI assessor.
- Founded Lucid Security and developed one of the leading IPS appliances for enterprises.
- Global Manager of Enterprise Internet and Security Services at Teleflex, a publicly-traded global manufacturing company.
- Co-founder of Intermedia
 Sciences Group, Inc., a security consulting firm.

NSS Labs

- A leading independent security product testing and certification lab.
- Performs product feature validation testing for PCI DSS requirements
- Tests & certifies firewalls, Network & Host IPS, UTM, Wireless, PKI/Encryption, DLP, Vulnerability Scanner, more.
- Largest security & performance testing lab in the world.





Agenda

- Approaches Review Mapping compliance to technology choice
- Case studies
 - Retail organization PCI
 - Healthcare HIPAA + PCI
 - Manufacturing SOX





Approaches Review

- Aim for security and achieve compliance (gap analysis, multiple compliance reqs?)
- Know where your data is
- Determine protection requirements
- Limit scope (data flows, retention)
- Products, People or Processes
- Seek answers from vendors





Information Security Products are tools

- Different products solve different problems
 - Products fulfill specific purposes You don't expect your screwdriver to saw wood
 - Multi-function tools (i.e. Swiss army knife) do lots of things, but are not usually best at solving a specific problem
 - It is okay to have a favorite tool... just don't expect it to be the only tool you will need





INFORMATION SECURITY DECISIONS

Selecting The Right Products

No product can MAKE you compliant...
...but the wrong products can impede your compliance efforts

Slide 6

RM1

Like the gist, hate the text. what concretely are we saying.

be able to DEFEND your choices? Rick, 3/10/2008

Case Study – PCI DSS





PCI Compliance

- Retail Organization
 - Privately Held
 - 200 storefronts
 - 3 regional centers
 - 1 Corporate HQ
 - Technologies Required:
 - Firewall
 - IDS/IPS
 - AV
 - Encryption (data-in-motion)
 - Encryption (data-at-rest)
 - Identity Management
 - Log Management





Firewalls

- Separate Inside (trusted) from outside (un-trusted)
- Traditionally Routing between Internal, External & DMZ networks
- Used to limit Access to/from a network or systems on the network = Access Control
- Operate at lower layers (IP, TCP, UDP, etc.)
- Good at enforcing access. Not good at catching attacks.
- Low maintenance & upkeep
- Low granularity of control (control of protocols, not content)





- What firewall requirements are we faced with?
 - PCI DSS v1.1 Requirement #1 = Install & Maintain a firewall to protect cardholder data
- Do they all "Segment"?
 - Some firewalls only segment Internal from External despite multiple NICs, while others allow you to create logically separate segments (one per NIC).
 - Per-domain administration?
 - How are you planning on using the firewall?
- Does the firewall encrypt all non-console administrative access?
- Does the firewall log all changes and provide a robust audit trail?





IDS/IPS

- "Deep Inspection" = look into the payload of the traffic
- High Maintenance & Upkeep
- Good at catching known attacks (exploits) against systems with vulnerabilities
- Different brands/manufacturers have different strengths
 - Client Protection (Web Browsers, E-Mail Clients, etc.)
 - Server Protection (Web Servers, E-Mail Servers, etc.)
 - Internal Applications (File & Print, DB, etc.)
 - Application Vendors (Microsoft, Sun, Open Source)
 - Protocols HTTP, HTTPS, SMTP, IMAP, Exchange, LDAP, DNS, RPC, NetBios, etc.
- Some Manufacturers: BlueLane, Cisco, IBM/ISS, Juniper, McAfee, SecureComputing, Sourcefire, TippingPoint, Third Brigade, TrustWave





PCI Compliance

Large Financial Institution & IDS/IPS

PCI DSS v1.1 – Requirement 11.4:

"Use network intrusion detection systems, host-based intrusion detection systems, and intrusion prevention systems to monitor all network traffic and alert personnel to suspected compromises. Keep all intrusion detection and prevention engines up-to-date."

- Claimed Firewall with "deep inspection" fulfilled IDS/IPS requirement because product vendor told them it would...
- It was determined that the firewall with "deep inspection" did <u>not</u> meet compliance requirements because it did not adequately protect the systems in question (E-Commerce Servers)
- 11.1: Test security controls, limitations, network connections, and restrictions annually to assure the <u>ability to adequately identify and to stop</u> any unauthorized access attempts.





PCI Compliance

Lesson Learned?

It is about a product's ability to perform the necessary functions based upon how/where it is being used.

"Appropriate Usage"

The same firewall with deep inspection <u>may</u> have been appropriate to protect a retail storefront IF it was good at protecting against client attacks (IE, Firefox, Adobe, etc.)





IDS/IPS

- Host IPS
 - Strength is in stopping complex attacks that may get past other security
 - System Resource Intensive
 - Cannot stop attacks that compromise OS at a lower layer/before HIPS (i.e. NIC Drivers)
- Network IPS
 - Good at stopping worms and fast moving attacks
 - Good at protecting against known vulnerabilities
 - Not good at stopping attacks against custom (web) apps





INFORMATION SECURITY DECISIONS

Selecting The Right Products

Common Protection Requirements

	ATTACKER INITIATED	CLIENT/TARGET INITIATED
RETAIL STOREFRONT		✓
CORPORATE PERIMETER	✓	√
E-COMMERCE DATACENTER	✓	
INTERNAL DATACENTER	✓	

CLIENT NAME: PRODUCT:						INDUSTRY COMP
DATE:						NSS SUM Average
TARGETS						Client Product
IARGEIS						Delta
	System	Service	Fault	Recon	DoS	Delta
Apple	85%	50%	90%	35%	50%	_
Borland	0%	20%	06%	75%	50%	

	System	Service	Fault	Recon	DoS .	Delta
ple	85%	50%	Q0%	35%	50%	_
rland	0%	20%	96%	75%	50%	PROTECTED E
	20%	90%	65%	25%	75%	PROTECTED E
	55%	60%	66%	65%	70%	Datacenter
4	35%	85%	40%	50%	80%	Perimeter
Alee	85%	15%	66%	55%	25%	R080 / S0H0
rosot	05%	25%	5%	35%	40%	Ecommerce
vell	5%	90%	66%	5%	20%	SCADA
en Source	0%	85%	25%	70%	15%	
acle	15%	40%	70%	20%	60%	EXPLOIT TYPE
dHat	50%	10%	56%	45%	0%	Attacker Initiated
Р	65%	40%	15%	80%	50%	Target Initiated
N	60%	85%	85%	35%	30%	Network
mantec	40%	66%	70%	35%	85%	Local

0% 45% 40% 45%

EXPLOIT S	SEVERIT	Y BY PRO	TOCOL	/ SERVI	CE
	System	Service	Foult	Recon	D ₀ S
HTTP / Web	50%	96%	85%	95%	35%
SMTP / Email	25%	90%	35%	40%	90%
RPC	5%	45%	95%	0%	85%
Telnet & SSH	85%	75%	70%	40%	56%
FTP	40%	45%	20%	55%	70%
DNS	30%	66%	45%	65%	0%
SQL	40%	10%	55%	80%	40%
XWindows	30%	65%	25%	80%	96%
NFS & AFS	30%	10%	90%	65%	80%
SCADA	80%	20%	50%	10%	40%

196						
_	EXPLOIT	DATE				
		System	Service	Fault	Recon	DoS
S	1006	10%	5%	45%	50%	35%
6	1000	5%	25%	20%	35%	90%
6	2000	15%	40%	50%	35%	95%
6	2001	5%	65%	25%	40%	90%
6	2002	5%	5%	10%	85%	55%
6	2003	85%	45%	30%	10%	10%
	2004	30%	15%	50%	30%	5%
6	2006	25%	95%	0%	0%	15%
6	2006	55%	90%	50%	45%	40%
6	2007	35%	15%	70%	5%	45%
6	2008	10%	15%	35%	30%	40%

TARGET OS/APPLICATION COVERAGE BY DATE												
	Pre	1998	1000	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Apple	Q5 %	85%	0%	85%	65%	60%	60%	50%	65%	20%	20%	20%
Borland	25%	25%	90%	50%	30%	90%	0%	95%	50%	85%	10%	20%
CA	25%	30%	70%	65%	60%	05%	5%	15%	75%	80%	85%	95%
HP	65%	70%	70%	20%	75%	65%	75%	70%	70%	5%	0%	10%
IBM	70%	60%	66%	80%	55%	60%	15%	30%	30%	80%	10%	90%
McAlee	Q5%	20%	56%	30%	25%	0%	40%	50%	66%	0%	35%	90%
Microsoft	70%	45%	35%	25%	10%	90%	15%	50%	96%	65%	65%	95%
Novell	65%	55%	90%	60%	70%	05%	50%	35%	55%	20%	35%	50%
Open Source	65%	75%	25%	10%	75%	10%	50%	90%	5%	55%	40%	60%
Oracle	90%	75%	20%	55%	45%	60%	85%	60%	90%	70%	95%	90%
RedHat	70%	35%	80%	75%	0%	20%	15%	20%	70%	0%	05%	25%
SAP	15%	90%	45%	25%	50%	0%	25%	90%	80%	40%	20%	90%
SUN	10%	20%	80%	0%	75%	70%	95%	25%	35%	20%	35%	70%
Symantec	0%	0%	5%	5%	55%	85%	55%	95%	30%	10%	45%	0%
Veritas	10%	65%	40%	5%	70%	65%	70%	70%	45%	25%	40%	45%

SERVICE DATE EFFECTIVENESS												
	Pre	1996	1900	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
HTTP / Web	45%	90%	85%	10%	10%	50%	65%	60%	35%	45%	00%	85%
SMTP / Email	85%	85%	35%	75%	35%	65%	10%	90%	90%	60%	80%	10%
RPC	30%	30%	30%	20%	95%	85%	5%	90%	15%	50%	30%	85%
Telnet & SSH	70%	30%	20%	75%	20%	50%	70%	10%	0%	80%	50%	10%
FTP	60%	40%	25%	80%	20%	10%	55%	10%	90%	0%	35%	50%
DNS	70%	75%	10%	10%	35%	60%	45%	50%	25%	25%	35%	50%
SQL	00%	25%	65%	40%	55%	0%	65%	15%	5%	50%	15%	25%
XWindows	75%	95%	60%	5%	5%	15%	65%	65%	90%	20%	75%	65%
NFS & AFS	25%	70%	10%	50%	95%	25%	40%	25%	0%	5%	20%	90%
SCADA	10%	45%	20%	45%	50%	90%	15%	25%	25%	65%	20%	15%





UTM

- Multi-Function Device: FW + VPN + IPS + WF + AV
- Evolved out of Firewalls firewall usually strong
- Decisions were made about what to emphasize no product can be all things
 - Perimeter Devices often cannot protect applications in the Core
 - Good at preventing people from bypassing Gateway AV (HTTP AV)
- Different brands/manufacturers have different strengths
 - Client Protection (Web Browsers, E-Mail Clients, etc.)
 - Server Protection (Web Servers, E-Mail Servers, etc.)
 - Application Vendors (Microsoft, Sun, Open Source)
 - Protocols HTTP, HTTPS, SMTP, IMAP, Exchange, DNS, RPC, etc.
- Some Manufacturers: Cisco, Fortinet, IBM/ISS, Juniper, SecureComputing, 3Com/TippingPoint






INFORMATION SECURITY DECISIONS

Remote Office / Branch Office / Retail Storefront

No DMZ or servers facing the Internet








INFORMATION SECURITY DECISIONS

E-Commerce Datacenter


No client traffic initiated from DMZ – All traffic initiated from outside of the network







Typical Traffic Flow







Where is UTM Appropriate?

- PCI says nothing specifically about UTMs
- However, PCI does mention firewall, IDS/IPS,
 AV, & Encryption of data-in-motion (VPN)
- UTMs are not generally not "best of breed"
- Must examine the threat & risk dynamics:
 - UTMs good at protecting Internet Services
 - Retail Storefront (client protection)
 - Corporate Perimeter (both client & server)
 - SIMPLE E-Commerce sites
 - UTMs NOT good at protecting INTERNAL services (SQL, NetBios, etc.)





"Web-facing" Application Security

- 6.5 Secure coding
 - OWASP Top 10 is a great start but... more than 10 significant vulnerability types in web apps
 - Other resources & tools
- 6.6 Code review or WAF
 - Mandatory as of June 30, 2008



Application Security Tools

Vulnerability Scanner (ext)

- Systems
- Services

Web App Firewall

- Protects Applications, databases
- OWASP Top 10
- Usually in DMZ

Web App Vulnerability Scanner

- Scans Web Applications externally for flaws
- Highly specific

Application Code Scanner

• Programmatic analysis of source/binary code. Used to speed up a code review.

Code Review

- Manual process of reading source code. Code Scanner used to make process more efficient.
- DSS 6.6 best practice until June 30, 2008





Vulnerability Assessment (Scanner)

- Look for network and "common" application vulnerabilities – IIS, Apache, etc.
- Usually look for circumstantial evidence
 - Don't run actual exploits nobody wants their systems to be crashed or compromised
- Used as an information gathering tool
- Not conclusive, but are a good measuring tool nonetheless
- Some Manufacturers: IBM/ISS, N-Circle, Qualys, Saint, Tenable (Nessus)





Web App Vulnerability Scanner

- Look for flaws in Web Applications
 - Look deeper and more thoroughly than traditional Vulnerability Scanners
 - Detect unique flaws within Web Applications (i.e. SQL Injection, Form Validation errors, etc.)
- Used as an information gathering tool
- Can be high maintenance Some products are prone to false positives
- Will be required by June 30, 2008
- Some Manufactures: Appscan, Cenzic, NT Objectives, SPI Dynamics (HP), Watchfire (IBM), Whitehat





Web App Firewall

- Compensating Control for PCI DSS 6.6 (vs. code review). June 30, 2008
- Enforce "positive" rules for Web Applications
 - Firewall for Layer-7
 - Look deeper than traditional Firewalls
 - Prevent flaws within Web Applications from being exploited (i.e. SQL Injection, Form Validation errors, etc.)
- Unforgiving: Only content you define as acceptable is allowed
- Some Manufactures: Barracuda, Breach, Citrix, F5, Fortify, eEye, Imperva, Mod Security, Sanctum





App Code Scanner (Static analysis)

- Examine the source code of Applications
 - Some can even examine binaries (Veracode)
 - Look for coding flaws
- Used as an information gathering tool
- Can be high maintenance
- Some Manufactures: Appscan, Cenzic, NT Objectives,
 SPI Dynamics (HP), Watchfire (IBM), Whitehat
- Not required by any Compliance regime, but it's inefficient to perform a code review and not use an App Code Scanner





Anti-Malware (Anti-Virus)

Host

- Strength is in stopping complex attacks that may get past other security
- Can be System Resource Intensive
- Cannot stop attacks that compromise OS at a lower layer/before AM/AV (i.e. NIC Drivers)
- Varying effectiveness (Strengths/Weaknesses) by product

Network/Gateway

- Email is not time-sensitive
- May be bypassed by someone using webmail
- Centralized good at seeing patterns & being proactive on a macro level



Case Study - HIPAA + PCI





Healthcare Organization

- Privately Held
 - 4 Hospitals
 - 30 medical centers (doctor's offices)
 - 1 Corporate HQ
- Technologies Required:
 - Firewall
 - IDS/IPS
 - AV
 - Encryption (data-in-motion)
 - Encryption (data-at-rest)
 - Data Leak Prevention (DLP)





Data Leak Prevention (DLP)

- Requires a lot of 'care & feeding' to minimize false negatives & false positives
- Good at stopping "Gilligan" but not "the Professor
- Content:
 - Simple regex?
 - Context aware?
 - Partial fragment recognition?
- Host: Good granular control, but resource intensive
- Network: Good for specific data (Credit Card & Social Security numbers)





- Encryption data-in-motion
 - Network-level tunneling (L2 and L3)
 - IPSec, some proprietary
 - Application-protocol-level tunneling
 - SSL VPN
 - Application-native crypto
 - Key management challenges how does solution do provisioning, revocation?
 - Especially if multiple technologies in use
 - How does the solution deploy, protect and store key material / certificates? Concentration of risk → audit risk
 - How is access control / key deployment auditable?
 - Impact on network latency and throughput?





- Encryption data-at-rest
 - Full-disk encryption (hardware-level, driver-level)
 - File-level encryption (OS or third-party)
 - Application-native crypto database, file
 - Key management challenges provisioning, revocation
 - Key management challenges how does solution do provisioning, revocation?
 - Especially if multiple technologies in use
 - How does the solution deploy, protect and store key material / certificates? Concentration of risk → audit risk
 - How is access control / key deployment auditable?
 - Impact on I/O latency and throughput
 - Especially in the context of bulk storage backup tapes





- Encryption deployment example
 - Healthcare provider implemented DBMS-level encryption
 - Disqualified as a mitigating control due to use of hardcoded keys
 - Key management is the hard part!

Case Study - SOX





- Mid-Sized Telecommunications Provider
 - Publicly Held
 - 15 corporate offices, 400+ POPs, 1000+ retail stores
 - 8000 employees
 - Technologies Required:
 - Firewall
 - IDS/IPS
 - AV
 - Encryption (data-in-motion)
 - Encryption (data-at-rest)
 - Identity Management
 - Log Management / SIM / SEM





Log Management / SIM / SEM

- SOX 404(a) requirement: "formal program" to retain, consolidate, and review log activity for all in-scope systems and devices including include monitoring of change requests and authorization, user account authorizations and application and system access controls
- What is breadth of device support (software, network, security? evaluate relative to unique environment
- Data acquisition speed?
- Agentless vs. agent-based?
- Log storage local, central, hierarchical/cached?
- Speed of raw data retrieval?
- Flexibility of Reporting (canned, custom), and speed of reporting
- Correlation based on rates/counts/vulns/assets → quality of alerting
- Actionability of alerting reduction of false positives
- Summarization (alert collapsing) reduction of noise





- Log Management / SIM / SEM
 - SOX pre-audit situation
 - Log retention and aggregation in place
 - Homebrew solution based on EventLog and Syslog collection
 - Pre-audit testing found adequate control of log content to be lacking – no formal process for alerting/review based on real-time or retained log data





Identity Management

- SOX 404(a) requirement: "adequate internal controls" with respect to user access and privileges
- What is breadth of available Integration Points? (OS/software/network)
 - Authentication?
 - Granular, app-level authorization?
- User Provisioning local/central/hierarchical/delegable?
- Role-based Management?
- Entitlement Management capabilities relative to unique application footprint
- Identity Audit (IdA) capabilities
 - Access controls, authorization / privileges
 - Positive and negative reporting relative to HR systems





- Identity Management
 - Pre-audit situation
 - IdM in place
 - Major vendor solution
 - Pre-audit testing found adequate control of access rights to be lacking
 - No implementation of negative reporting relative to SAP/HR systems: inability to positively confirm that specific users did *not* have access to certain systems





Summary

- Map compliance requirements into security objectives, and RFPs
- Ensure people & processes can support effective use of products
- Track users & data. Segment to limit scope.
- Determine detailed protection requirements to show justification & set expectations
- If you can't get answers from vendors it may be a fad